I began a discussion on Eastern Orthodoxy, giving some of the history and basic differences between the Eastern and Western church. This is the first part in a series of shows that will deal with the unique teachings of the Eastern Church.
Showing posts with label Theosis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Theosis. Show all posts
Wednesday, February 19, 2014
An Introduction to Eastern Orthodoxy
I began a discussion on Eastern Orthodoxy, giving some of the history and basic differences between the Eastern and Western church. This is the first part in a series of shows that will deal with the unique teachings of the Eastern Church.
Tuesday, December 10, 2013
An Explanation of the Luther Chapter in my Book
Since the recent discussion has erupted over my book, some have attempted to see my Luther chapter as somehow an attempt to give an extensive treatment of Luther's doctrine of justification. This relies on a misunderstanding of the purpose of the book. I will explain the reasons why this chapter was written, and exactly what argument is being made.
The book is on the New Perspective on Paul's claims regarding historical theology. The two areas I am addressing are 1. The NPP view of Luther as a purely forensic theologian whose sole concern is the distinction between law and gospel, and 2. The claim that Augustine changed the church's reading on Paul as if the pre-Augustinian church was not concerned about individual salvation.
The first chapter in this volume is not intended to be an extensive treatment of Luther's theology, nor of his doctrine of justification. Rather, it is an attempt to argue that Luther held to a more multifaceted soteriology than he is often given credit for. Yes, Luther held to forensic justification, the imputation of righteousness, etc. However, that is not central to the argument of this chapter because that is a given. I am not asking if Luther's view is forensic, but if Luther's view is only forensic. I use Mannermaa to argue that there is an element of union with Christ inherent in Luther's theology of justification as expounded upon in his Galatians commentary. I do not consider myself as part of the New Finnish School of Luther interpretation, because I think they downplay the forensicism inherent in Luther's theology, and they tend not to make a careful enough distinction between the early and late Luther. I make the point in this chapter that the early Luther can often speak of justification as a process, and that he sometimes conflates justification and sanctification; the later Luther is more careful, as forensic language becomes more predominant in his thought. However, whatever issues the Finnish school has, they have brought an element of Luther's thought to the forefront which has often been neglected: union with Christ. For Luther, Christ is present in faith itself, and Christ is in a vital personal union with one who believes. Though this union is not identical to justification for Luther, they are intimately related concepts which should not be severed from one another.
There has been a long debate in Pauline studies over whether the apostle's soteriology is forensic or participationist. Is it based on imputation of Christ's righteousness, or mystical participation in Christ? I am trying to show that in both Luther, and the fathers, this is a false dichotomy. For Luther, salvation includes legal terminology, imputed righteousness, etc. It also includes participation in Christ, and union with God. The legal aspects of Paul's soteriology are then shown to have been prominent in both Clement of Rome and the Epistle to Diognetus. The participationist motifs are prominent in both Ignatius, and Justin Martyr.
The whole argument is that the manner in which the NPP has interpreted Paul is not in line with the earliest interpreters; the way in which Luther has interpreted Paul, however, is consistent with Patristic exegesis. Though one would be wrong to label the fathers consistent Lutherans, the reading Luther has of Paul is more thoroughly grounded in Patristic exegesis and theology than is the NPP.
Saturday, December 7, 2013
Response to Donavan Riley's "Review" of my Book
A review of my book was recently posted on Blogia by pastor Donavan Riley. It can be found here. Normally such a scathing and dishonest review would not be worth responding to, but due to the fact that the word about this seems to have gotten around, I have chosen to do so.
Riley accuses me of "pietism and radical spiritualism" in the second paragraph of his review, but fails to define either of those terms or cite an instance in my work where that is indeed the case. In fact, there are no citations of my book in the review at all. Riley chose to focus on one specific chapter of the book, rather than the entirety of my argument, and consequently attacks my view as somehow connected with Schwenkfeld.
The heart of Riley's argument is that: "Leaning on the Finns for his critique of the New Perspective on Paul, Cooper ends up launching a similar attack on forensic justification. He argues for an essential form of justification, an ontological change in believers."
This was certainly a surprise to me, as I hadn't realized myself to be one who disagrees with forensic justification! The purpose of my discussion of forensic/participationist soteriological motifs in Luther's theology was not to negate the historic Lutheran understanding of justification as forensic, but to argue that in Luther's theology, forensic and participationist categories are not mutually exclusive. I write in the book: "Mannermaa's contention that ontological union is part of what Luther means when discussing the concept of justification seems to be contradicted by several statements of Luther. Though they are connected concepts, Luther often distinguishes between ontological union and justification" (P.61). Justification is a forensic declaration which includes the imputation of Christ's righteousness.
What I argue in the book is that for Luther, ontological union precedes justification. That does not mean that ontological union is justification. This statement may be controversial, as the general ordo salutis in Lutheranism has placed mystical union after justification rather than vice versa. However, I am not alone in arguing this point, as Kurt Marquart argues the same way in his article, "Luther and Theosis." There is also some precedent for this in the Lutheran dogmaticians, as David Hollaz argues that union can in some sense be said to be prior to justification. Schmid writes:
"According to another mode of considering it, it can be said that union precedes justification, inasmuch as faith precedes justification ; and in faith as the organ, by which the union is effected, its beginning is already presupposed. Therefore Holl. (933), after consenting to this view, adds: 'Although the mystical union, by which God dwells in the soul as in a temple, may, according to our mode of conception, follow justification in the order of nature, it is however to be acknowledged that the formal union of faith, by which Christ is apprehended, put on, and united with us, as a mediator and the author of grace and pardon, logically precedes justification. For faith is imputed for righteousness, so far as this receives the merit of Christ, and so unites it with ourselves as to make it ours.'" (Schmid, 497)
It is to be noted that I am not speaking of the mystical union by which believers grow in virtue and love when I am speaking about union preceding justification. This was Osiander's error, which identified the justification with growth in grace. Rather, what I am referring to is the fact that the believer has to be united to Christ in order to receive his righteousness. I have to be "in Christ," in order for God to declare me justified.
Riley further critiques the book writing: "What Luther does not seem to be up to in the Galatians commentary, since Cooper does not emphasize these matters in his book, is distinguishing law and Gospel, the theology of the cross, or the theology of the Word." The purpose of my book is to discuss Paul's view of justification as interpreted by Luther and the fathers, and thus I utilized the Galatians commentary to speak of one particular aspect of Luther's theology that is pertinent to the study. Nowhere have I argued that Luther's theology of the Word or law and gospel are not central to his thought. Clearly, they are. Of course, I was not writing a treatise on the major themes of Luther's Galatians commentary.
Riley argues again: "Schwenkfeld was the one to start talking among Lutherans about “participation” in Christʼs glorified humanity, or having a union with “heavenly flesh.” This is the very thing the Finns and Cooper are trying to connect to the early fathers and Luther via the tradition of theosis. Theosis is, in essence, enthusiasm, which grasps for God outside the Word, deep in the flesh (logos sarkos) in which we can “participate” in divinity."
I have written a book on theosis that will be released next year. In that work, I explicitly reject the idea that one grasps God apart from Word and Sacrament. That is one of my primary criticisms of the Eastern Orthodox approach to deification. What I affirm is simply the historic Lutheran teaching of mystical union.
The next point Riley makes is: "But where Cooper emphasizes increased holiness by divine law, there should instead be death and resurrection. Where he emphasizes ontology, there should be eschatology." First, the idea of increased holiness by divine law is not in the book at all. It appears that Riley is reading other things I have written (which don't teach that either) into this work, rather than actually digesting what is in the chapters. Regarding eschatology, I actually have a section in the Luther chapter titled "Luther and Eschatology," where I make the point that Mannermaa misses Luther's eschatological focus. It seems Riley did not read this chapter carefully.
He further claims that: "Cooper grounds his critique of the New Perspective on Paul by following Mannermaa into the Galatians commentary, where the latter emphasizes a theology of love which reflects, not Lutherʼs search for a gracious God, but Schwenkfeldʼs search for pure love, found finally in being formed in Christ himself as our complete and perfected holiness. Sin is then formulated as misdirected love. Faith is redirected love, when Jesus himself effects this in the Christian. Righteousness is an ontological reality." The theology of love that Riley discusses here is completely irrelevant to the purpose of my book and is not even mentioned here. This seems to be a description of a traditional Augustinian approach to sin and love that I do not hold to.
He then states that "This is routinely missed by Cooper in his book, who seems to think that being in Christ is a process of becoming less one thing and becoming (ontologically) more of another thing. In this case, the sinful human passing over into the holy divine." I would affirm, with Lutheran Orthodoxy, that the union with God that the Christian has is genuine and real. This grows throughout the Christian's life, but one is never absorbed into God so that personal identity is lost.
The final claim I want to examine, which is likely the most inaccurate, is where Riley writes:
"Cooper opens a way to argue that deification of human nature in Christ is a prerequisite for justification. Following the Finns allows Cooper to dance lightly around the confusion this then interjects into matters of glory-theology, faith and love, bondage of the will, simul iustus et peccator, and the works of the Holy Spirit."
I have never, nor would I argue that anything within the human person is a "prerequisite for justification." The only prerequisite for justification is the righteousness of Christ. I'm sure that such a theology might affect the areas of faith Riley mentions, but that is irrelevant to my own theology.
Overall, the position Riley critiques is a gross caricature of my view. His review failed to use any citations, overlooked quotes which would disprove is misrepresentations, and he didn't even engage the argument of the book. The section on Mannermaa's interpretation of Luther is a small aspect of this volume, which is on the subject of the New Perspective on Paul and Patristic theology. Riley seems to have used this book as a means to expound upon his own problems with the Finnish interpretation of Luther, rather than actually engaging the text.
Riley accuses me of "pietism and radical spiritualism" in the second paragraph of his review, but fails to define either of those terms or cite an instance in my work where that is indeed the case. In fact, there are no citations of my book in the review at all. Riley chose to focus on one specific chapter of the book, rather than the entirety of my argument, and consequently attacks my view as somehow connected with Schwenkfeld.
The heart of Riley's argument is that: "Leaning on the Finns for his critique of the New Perspective on Paul, Cooper ends up launching a similar attack on forensic justification. He argues for an essential form of justification, an ontological change in believers."
This was certainly a surprise to me, as I hadn't realized myself to be one who disagrees with forensic justification! The purpose of my discussion of forensic/participationist soteriological motifs in Luther's theology was not to negate the historic Lutheran understanding of justification as forensic, but to argue that in Luther's theology, forensic and participationist categories are not mutually exclusive. I write in the book: "Mannermaa's contention that ontological union is part of what Luther means when discussing the concept of justification seems to be contradicted by several statements of Luther. Though they are connected concepts, Luther often distinguishes between ontological union and justification" (P.61). Justification is a forensic declaration which includes the imputation of Christ's righteousness.
What I argue in the book is that for Luther, ontological union precedes justification. That does not mean that ontological union is justification. This statement may be controversial, as the general ordo salutis in Lutheranism has placed mystical union after justification rather than vice versa. However, I am not alone in arguing this point, as Kurt Marquart argues the same way in his article, "Luther and Theosis." There is also some precedent for this in the Lutheran dogmaticians, as David Hollaz argues that union can in some sense be said to be prior to justification. Schmid writes:
"According to another mode of considering it, it can be said that union precedes justification, inasmuch as faith precedes justification ; and in faith as the organ, by which the union is effected, its beginning is already presupposed. Therefore Holl. (933), after consenting to this view, adds: 'Although the mystical union, by which God dwells in the soul as in a temple, may, according to our mode of conception, follow justification in the order of nature, it is however to be acknowledged that the formal union of faith, by which Christ is apprehended, put on, and united with us, as a mediator and the author of grace and pardon, logically precedes justification. For faith is imputed for righteousness, so far as this receives the merit of Christ, and so unites it with ourselves as to make it ours.'" (Schmid, 497)
It is to be noted that I am not speaking of the mystical union by which believers grow in virtue and love when I am speaking about union preceding justification. This was Osiander's error, which identified the justification with growth in grace. Rather, what I am referring to is the fact that the believer has to be united to Christ in order to receive his righteousness. I have to be "in Christ," in order for God to declare me justified.
Riley further critiques the book writing: "What Luther does not seem to be up to in the Galatians commentary, since Cooper does not emphasize these matters in his book, is distinguishing law and Gospel, the theology of the cross, or the theology of the Word." The purpose of my book is to discuss Paul's view of justification as interpreted by Luther and the fathers, and thus I utilized the Galatians commentary to speak of one particular aspect of Luther's theology that is pertinent to the study. Nowhere have I argued that Luther's theology of the Word or law and gospel are not central to his thought. Clearly, they are. Of course, I was not writing a treatise on the major themes of Luther's Galatians commentary.
Riley argues again: "Schwenkfeld was the one to start talking among Lutherans about “participation” in Christʼs glorified humanity, or having a union with “heavenly flesh.” This is the very thing the Finns and Cooper are trying to connect to the early fathers and Luther via the tradition of theosis. Theosis is, in essence, enthusiasm, which grasps for God outside the Word, deep in the flesh (logos sarkos) in which we can “participate” in divinity."
I have written a book on theosis that will be released next year. In that work, I explicitly reject the idea that one grasps God apart from Word and Sacrament. That is one of my primary criticisms of the Eastern Orthodox approach to deification. What I affirm is simply the historic Lutheran teaching of mystical union.
The next point Riley makes is: "But where Cooper emphasizes increased holiness by divine law, there should instead be death and resurrection. Where he emphasizes ontology, there should be eschatology." First, the idea of increased holiness by divine law is not in the book at all. It appears that Riley is reading other things I have written (which don't teach that either) into this work, rather than actually digesting what is in the chapters. Regarding eschatology, I actually have a section in the Luther chapter titled "Luther and Eschatology," where I make the point that Mannermaa misses Luther's eschatological focus. It seems Riley did not read this chapter carefully.
He further claims that: "Cooper grounds his critique of the New Perspective on Paul by following Mannermaa into the Galatians commentary, where the latter emphasizes a theology of love which reflects, not Lutherʼs search for a gracious God, but Schwenkfeldʼs search for pure love, found finally in being formed in Christ himself as our complete and perfected holiness. Sin is then formulated as misdirected love. Faith is redirected love, when Jesus himself effects this in the Christian. Righteousness is an ontological reality." The theology of love that Riley discusses here is completely irrelevant to the purpose of my book and is not even mentioned here. This seems to be a description of a traditional Augustinian approach to sin and love that I do not hold to.
He then states that "This is routinely missed by Cooper in his book, who seems to think that being in Christ is a process of becoming less one thing and becoming (ontologically) more of another thing. In this case, the sinful human passing over into the holy divine." I would affirm, with Lutheran Orthodoxy, that the union with God that the Christian has is genuine and real. This grows throughout the Christian's life, but one is never absorbed into God so that personal identity is lost.
The final claim I want to examine, which is likely the most inaccurate, is where Riley writes:
"Cooper opens a way to argue that deification of human nature in Christ is a prerequisite for justification. Following the Finns allows Cooper to dance lightly around the confusion this then interjects into matters of glory-theology, faith and love, bondage of the will, simul iustus et peccator, and the works of the Holy Spirit."
I have never, nor would I argue that anything within the human person is a "prerequisite for justification." The only prerequisite for justification is the righteousness of Christ. I'm sure that such a theology might affect the areas of faith Riley mentions, but that is irrelevant to my own theology.
Overall, the position Riley critiques is a gross caricature of my view. His review failed to use any citations, overlooked quotes which would disprove is misrepresentations, and he didn't even engage the argument of the book. The section on Mannermaa's interpretation of Luther is a small aspect of this volume, which is on the subject of the New Perspective on Paul and Patristic theology. Riley seems to have used this book as a means to expound upon his own problems with the Finnish interpretation of Luther, rather than actually engaging the text.
Saturday, July 27, 2013
Beyond Imputed Righteousness: A Reappraisal of the Great Exchange
I have posted an essay which contains many of the themes that will be expounded upon in my upcoming book Christification: A Lutheran Approach to Theosis. This essay presents an argument that Luther's "great exchange" formula is more than a legal transaction. Drawing on Patristic and Medieval sources, Luther's idea of the great exchange involves a concept of theosis alongside of forensic imputation.
Here is the article.
Here is the article.
Thursday, July 18, 2013
Lutheranism and Theosis
The book I am currently working on is an evaluation of the Eastern Orthodox doctrine of theosis from a Lutheran perspective. I make the argument that Lutherans can and should adopt a teaching of theosis, as it is taught in the fathers, Luther's writings, and our Confessions. The language may make us, as Lutherans, somewhat uneasy, but whatever terminology is utilized, the concept is one that is Biblical and catholic.
Theosis is defined by Norman Russel as "our restoration as persons to integrity and wholeness by participation in Christ through the Holy Spirit, in a process which is initiated in this world through our life of ecclesial communion and moral striving and finds ultimate fulfillment in our union with the Father—all within the broad context of the divine economy." (Fellow Workers With God, 21)
For the Eastern Orthodox Church, salvation is primarily viewed as participationist, focusing on Christ in us, rather than Christ for us. The Lutheran tradition has tended to promote a soteriology that is predominantly forensic in light of the legal approach taken to the doctrine of justification and the priority of Christ for us. These two conceptions need not be pitted against one another, as if soteriology needs to be either juridical or participationist. Both motifs are present in the writings of Paul, the early fathers, and Luther.
It is my contention that theosis is a helpful and needed approach to salvation, and should be seen as "Christification." The earliest fathers including Ignatius, Irenaeus, and Athanasius took a Christological approach to the concept of deification. this is apparent in Athanasius' formula that "God became man so that man might become god." God took a human nature upon himself, and consequently gives us various attributes of divinity including immortality, incorruptibility and righteousness. This is to be carefully distinguished from the concept of apotheosis which teaches that humans can actually become divine by nature. Later Eastern writers, stemming from the writings of Dionysius the Areopogite, place deification in philosophical categories rather than the more strictly Biblical and less speculative approach of Athanasius. This latter approach has been adopted by the Eastern Orthodox Church, especially by those in the Neo-Palamite school of thought. It is the earlier approach of Irenaeus and Athanasius which comports with a Christological and Biblically oriented theology, rather than Palamism.
Christification is not a replacement of forensic justification as some in the Finnish approach to Luther have argued, but it's a complimentary reality. The Lutheran scholastic tradition spoke of this concept under the phrase "mystical union." Adolf Hoenecke is particularly insightful on this subject in his Evangelical Lutheran Dogmatics. He writes,
"The mystical union of the believers with God consists in that the triune God through the Holy Spirit essentially is graciously present in believers, through which those thus united with God not only blessedly rejoice and are filled with comfort and peace but are also made constantly more certain in grace, strengthened in sanctification, and preserved for eternal life." ELD III, 385
Along with forensic justification, through the imputed righteousness of Christ, God himself also dwells in his people. This divine indwelling is a real-ontic reality as opposed to the Ritschlian concept that it is a unity of will, rather than an actual ontological union. Through this divine indwelling, God grants grace, eternal life, and growth in holiness. Through this union, the believer is continually conformed to the image of Christ. Hoenecke also writes,
"According to these passages the essence of the mystical union is that God according to his substance in a miraculous way is close to the substance of humans and permeates their substance with his essence (Jn 17:21-23), and dwelling in the believers, he so works in them that they are filled with knowledge and all the fullness of God (Eph 3:17-19). When we describe the mystical union as the presence of the divine substance with the substance of humans, we express its intimacy. Two intimate friends cannot be so closely united. With the substance of their souls they are near each other; but God and the believers are in each other. The substance of both touches each other most closely; indeed the divine permeates the human. But self-evidently, every thought of an essential partaking of the believer in the substance of God, every mixing of God and man, every pantheistic notion of deification is far from this." ELD III, 386
Hoenecke is careful to argue for a real union with God without allowing for a blending of natures, so that the unique character of God is protected. Luther writes similarly in many places, especially in his Galatians commentary. For example:
"But so far as justification is concerned, Christ and I must be so closely attached that He lives in me and I in Him. What a marvelous way of speaking! Because He lives in me, whatever grace, righteousness, life, peace, and salvation there is in me is all Christ’s; nevertheless, it is mine as well, by the cementing and attachment that are through faith, by which we become as one body in the Spirit." LW 26, 127-128
For Luther, there is no separation of God's person from his gifts. When he grants us the righteousness of Christ, he grants us Christ himself. This idea is reflected in the Large Catechism,
"But the Creed brings pure grace and makes us righteous and acceptable to God. Through this knowledge we come to love and delight in all the commandments of God because we see here in the Creed how God gives himself completely to us, with all his gifts and power, to help us keep the Ten Commandments: the Father gives us all creation, Christ all his works, the Holy Spirit all his gifts." (LC II.68)
God grants his gifts including creation, and the work of Christ. Along with such gifts he grants himself, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Through this gift, the Christian is able to delight in God's Law. This union becomes the basis by which Christians grow in their faith, and are daily renewed, killing the old Adam. It is to be noted, however, that the Lutheran approach to this is much less optimistic than the Orthodox, who reach toward a possible goal of sinless perfection prior to one's eschatological glorification. For Luther, the continual forgiveness of sins is still the most essential aspect of the Christian life, though this does not negate the reality of divine indwelling and the actualization of holiness within the Christian.
Theosis is defined by Norman Russel as "our restoration as persons to integrity and wholeness by participation in Christ through the Holy Spirit, in a process which is initiated in this world through our life of ecclesial communion and moral striving and finds ultimate fulfillment in our union with the Father—all within the broad context of the divine economy." (Fellow Workers With God, 21)
For the Eastern Orthodox Church, salvation is primarily viewed as participationist, focusing on Christ in us, rather than Christ for us. The Lutheran tradition has tended to promote a soteriology that is predominantly forensic in light of the legal approach taken to the doctrine of justification and the priority of Christ for us. These two conceptions need not be pitted against one another, as if soteriology needs to be either juridical or participationist. Both motifs are present in the writings of Paul, the early fathers, and Luther.
It is my contention that theosis is a helpful and needed approach to salvation, and should be seen as "Christification." The earliest fathers including Ignatius, Irenaeus, and Athanasius took a Christological approach to the concept of deification. this is apparent in Athanasius' formula that "God became man so that man might become god." God took a human nature upon himself, and consequently gives us various attributes of divinity including immortality, incorruptibility and righteousness. This is to be carefully distinguished from the concept of apotheosis which teaches that humans can actually become divine by nature. Later Eastern writers, stemming from the writings of Dionysius the Areopogite, place deification in philosophical categories rather than the more strictly Biblical and less speculative approach of Athanasius. This latter approach has been adopted by the Eastern Orthodox Church, especially by those in the Neo-Palamite school of thought. It is the earlier approach of Irenaeus and Athanasius which comports with a Christological and Biblically oriented theology, rather than Palamism.
Christification is not a replacement of forensic justification as some in the Finnish approach to Luther have argued, but it's a complimentary reality. The Lutheran scholastic tradition spoke of this concept under the phrase "mystical union." Adolf Hoenecke is particularly insightful on this subject in his Evangelical Lutheran Dogmatics. He writes,
"The mystical union of the believers with God consists in that the triune God through the Holy Spirit essentially is graciously present in believers, through which those thus united with God not only blessedly rejoice and are filled with comfort and peace but are also made constantly more certain in grace, strengthened in sanctification, and preserved for eternal life." ELD III, 385
Along with forensic justification, through the imputed righteousness of Christ, God himself also dwells in his people. This divine indwelling is a real-ontic reality as opposed to the Ritschlian concept that it is a unity of will, rather than an actual ontological union. Through this divine indwelling, God grants grace, eternal life, and growth in holiness. Through this union, the believer is continually conformed to the image of Christ. Hoenecke also writes,
"According to these passages the essence of the mystical union is that God according to his substance in a miraculous way is close to the substance of humans and permeates their substance with his essence (Jn 17:21-23), and dwelling in the believers, he so works in them that they are filled with knowledge and all the fullness of God (Eph 3:17-19). When we describe the mystical union as the presence of the divine substance with the substance of humans, we express its intimacy. Two intimate friends cannot be so closely united. With the substance of their souls they are near each other; but God and the believers are in each other. The substance of both touches each other most closely; indeed the divine permeates the human. But self-evidently, every thought of an essential partaking of the believer in the substance of God, every mixing of God and man, every pantheistic notion of deification is far from this." ELD III, 386
Hoenecke is careful to argue for a real union with God without allowing for a blending of natures, so that the unique character of God is protected. Luther writes similarly in many places, especially in his Galatians commentary. For example:
"But so far as justification is concerned, Christ and I must be so closely attached that He lives in me and I in Him. What a marvelous way of speaking! Because He lives in me, whatever grace, righteousness, life, peace, and salvation there is in me is all Christ’s; nevertheless, it is mine as well, by the cementing and attachment that are through faith, by which we become as one body in the Spirit." LW 26, 127-128
For Luther, there is no separation of God's person from his gifts. When he grants us the righteousness of Christ, he grants us Christ himself. This idea is reflected in the Large Catechism,
"But the Creed brings pure grace and makes us righteous and acceptable to God. Through this knowledge we come to love and delight in all the commandments of God because we see here in the Creed how God gives himself completely to us, with all his gifts and power, to help us keep the Ten Commandments: the Father gives us all creation, Christ all his works, the Holy Spirit all his gifts." (LC II.68)
God grants his gifts including creation, and the work of Christ. Along with such gifts he grants himself, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Through this gift, the Christian is able to delight in God's Law. This union becomes the basis by which Christians grow in their faith, and are daily renewed, killing the old Adam. It is to be noted, however, that the Lutheran approach to this is much less optimistic than the Orthodox, who reach toward a possible goal of sinless perfection prior to one's eschatological glorification. For Luther, the continual forgiveness of sins is still the most essential aspect of the Christian life, though this does not negate the reality of divine indwelling and the actualization of holiness within the Christian.
Friday, July 5, 2013
My Book "The Righteousness of One" is Now Available!
An updated version of my Masters Thesis The Righteousness of One: An Evaluation of Early Patristic Soteriology in Light of the New Perspective on Paul is now available to order at the Wipf & Stock site here. It will be available on Amazon in the near future.
In the forward, Peter Leithart writes that this book "should have a dramatic effect on the debate" regarding the New Perspective on Paul. He writes that,
"Cooper does not claim to pass final judgment on the New Perspective. What he offers is the opportunity to renew the debate in a more historically informed fashion. Having cleared the clutter, Cooper leaves us still with the task of grasping what St. Paul really said."
In the forward, Peter Leithart writes that this book "should have a dramatic effect on the debate" regarding the New Perspective on Paul. He writes that,
"Cooper does not claim to pass final judgment on the New Perspective. What he offers is the opportunity to renew the debate in a more historically informed fashion. Having cleared the clutter, Cooper leaves us still with the task of grasping what St. Paul really said."
Tuesday, June 4, 2013
A Review of William W. Schumacher's "Who Do I Say That You Are?"
The most comprehensive critique of the Finnish school of Luther interpretation available in English is the volume of William Schumacher titled, Who Do I Say That You Are? Anthropology and the Theology of Theosis in the Finnish School of Tuomo Mannermaa. Arguing from an anthropological perspective, Schumacher argues that the Finnish school has misinterpreted Luther's theology, replacing Luther's theology of the word with an ontologically focused approach to the human person. For Schumacher's Luther it is God's word of address to the sinner, as a creative word, which has primacy. This is distinguished from Finnish writers who propose that the human creature is defined by ontological union with God.
For Schumacher, the traditional Lutheran approach to justification and Mannermaa's school are incompatible with one another. Justification is either theosis (Mannermaa) or forensic (the Book of Concord). Thus Mannermaa's approach to justification is essentially an attack on the entire Lutheran tradition after the Osiandrian controversy. Schumacher purports that the Finnish school is "if not a complete rehabilitation of Osiander, then at least the attempt to salvage key elements of his system which has been previously rejected by the Lutheranism of the Formula of Concord."(91) Schumacher points out that the Osiandrian error involved more than a denial of the unity of Christ's two natures, but also the prioritizing of the incarnation of Christ over his death and resurrection, leaving the cross in a subsidiary position. I think Schumacher's argument here is partially correct. There is an overemphasis in many of the Finnish writers on the incarnation, which makes salvation primarily an ontological reality, displacing the objective event of the cross. I don't think the solution to this problem is to reject ontological categories, and the soteriological significance of the incarnation as Schumacher does, but is to have a balanced approach to the soteriological significance of all events in Christ's life. In Lutheran soteriology (along with that of Paul), the cross is always the central salvific event. I think a more balanced approach would be to take the Finnish theology of incarnation, and place it within the context of the Formula's forensic emphasis. While the forensic elements of salvation may be primary, there are also strong ontological themes in Luther's thought which need not be neglected.
One of the problems with Schumacher's contention that the Finnish school is essentially Osiandrian is that he fails to discuss the primary problems with Osiander's theology according to the Formula of Concord. The Formula isn't condemning the concept of ontological union, or the importance of Christ's indwelling; rather, the Formula is seeking to clarify that the infusion of love and other virtues does not precede justification. In other words, the concern of the Formula is salvation by works, not the idea that Christ is present in faith. I think the problem here begins with the Finnish interpretation who conclude that the Formula is opposed to Luther. I don't think such a division exists. Luther places salvation in both juridical and participationist categories. The Formula focuses on the forensic elements (rightly so I think) because of the necessity of clarifying these issues in light of Osiander's teaching. This shouldn't be pitted against Luther's own theology, when Luther was willing to approve of Melancthon's writings on justification with primarily (at times exclusively) forensic language.
The most interesting chapter in Schumacher's work is in his evaluation of Luther's own writings. Schumacher rightly points out that the Finnish school tends to conflate the early and late Luther, ignoring the development of Luther's thought, especially his great Reformation discovery. It is somewhat surprising that one of the most significant passages for the Finnish school comes from a Christmas sermon in 1514, when Luther hadn't yet developed his mature understanding of justification. In some of the more extreme forms of the Finnish approach (Karkkainen for example), the Reformation discovery is almost completely ignored, and one wonders why the Medieval church would even have an issue with Luther's view of justification if this interpretation were correct. Here is where I think Schumacher paints with too broad a brush. While many in this school ignore the categories of imputation, and even sola fide, Mannermaa is careful to place these categories in the context of Luther's overall thought, though I do agree that he downplays their importance. This chapter demonstrates that some of the language used by the Finnish school doesn't mean what they claim in the context of Luther's own writings. However, I remain convinced of the central thesis of Mannermaa that Luther teaches that an ontological union with Christ is the metaphysical basis for God's gracious imputation. In otherwords, Christ is truly present in faith, giving himself to the Christian as righteousness, especially through the debt paid on the cross and Christ's victory over the devil according to both natures; this does not neglect the fact that the union of God and man in the incarnation is also a necessary part of the Christian's righteousness. (Regarding the so-called "active obedience" of Christ, I don't find this theme in Luther, though I personally do affirm its validity).
One of my primary areas of interest, especially as I dealt with this topic in my book The Righteousness of One: An Evaluation of Early Patristic Soteriology in Light of the New Perspective on Paul, is in the connection between Luther's theology and that of the Church fathers. Schumacher convincingly demonstrates that the influence of the Greek fathers on Luther has been overstated by the Finnish school. Luther's primary influences, rather, were Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome, Bernard, and the German mystical tradition. He correctly points out that deification language in Luther is taken from medieval mysticism, and is thus not identical with Eastern conceptions of theosis. I would point out, however, that there are many commonalities between the mystical tradition which Luther praises and the Eastern fathers. Whether the Eastern fathers had any significant influence on Bernard, Tauler, or the Theologia Germanica remains to be demonstrated, but one cannot help seeing certain common themes. The Theologia Germanica, for example, states: “God assumed human nature or humanity. He
became humanized and man became divinized. That is the way amends were made." (The Theologia Germanica of Martin Luther, 63) It seems unthinkable to me that Luther would promote and publish the Theologia Germanica and the works of Tauler throughout his life if he didn't agree with their conviction that salvation is in some sense an ontological event.
Schumacher's book is a fascinating read, and is essential to grapple with for any interested in this issue. Schumacher points out some of the genuine flaws in Finnish Luther research, which often lets an ecumenical agenda guide research, rather than letting the evidence speak for itself. However, in doing this, Shumacher swings too far in the other direction, ignoring the ontological soteriological concepts that are prominent in such works as "On Christian Liberty", "Two Kinds of Righteousness", and the 1535 Galatians commentary. The fact that Luther could promote both Melancthon's works which deal almost exclusively in legal categories, and the Theologia Germanica which deals almost exclusively in ontological categories should show us that both sides in this debate have often set up a false dichotomy which was foreign to Luther.
For Schumacher, the traditional Lutheran approach to justification and Mannermaa's school are incompatible with one another. Justification is either theosis (Mannermaa) or forensic (the Book of Concord). Thus Mannermaa's approach to justification is essentially an attack on the entire Lutheran tradition after the Osiandrian controversy. Schumacher purports that the Finnish school is "if not a complete rehabilitation of Osiander, then at least the attempt to salvage key elements of his system which has been previously rejected by the Lutheranism of the Formula of Concord."(91) Schumacher points out that the Osiandrian error involved more than a denial of the unity of Christ's two natures, but also the prioritizing of the incarnation of Christ over his death and resurrection, leaving the cross in a subsidiary position. I think Schumacher's argument here is partially correct. There is an overemphasis in many of the Finnish writers on the incarnation, which makes salvation primarily an ontological reality, displacing the objective event of the cross. I don't think the solution to this problem is to reject ontological categories, and the soteriological significance of the incarnation as Schumacher does, but is to have a balanced approach to the soteriological significance of all events in Christ's life. In Lutheran soteriology (along with that of Paul), the cross is always the central salvific event. I think a more balanced approach would be to take the Finnish theology of incarnation, and place it within the context of the Formula's forensic emphasis. While the forensic elements of salvation may be primary, there are also strong ontological themes in Luther's thought which need not be neglected.
One of the problems with Schumacher's contention that the Finnish school is essentially Osiandrian is that he fails to discuss the primary problems with Osiander's theology according to the Formula of Concord. The Formula isn't condemning the concept of ontological union, or the importance of Christ's indwelling; rather, the Formula is seeking to clarify that the infusion of love and other virtues does not precede justification. In other words, the concern of the Formula is salvation by works, not the idea that Christ is present in faith. I think the problem here begins with the Finnish interpretation who conclude that the Formula is opposed to Luther. I don't think such a division exists. Luther places salvation in both juridical and participationist categories. The Formula focuses on the forensic elements (rightly so I think) because of the necessity of clarifying these issues in light of Osiander's teaching. This shouldn't be pitted against Luther's own theology, when Luther was willing to approve of Melancthon's writings on justification with primarily (at times exclusively) forensic language.
The most interesting chapter in Schumacher's work is in his evaluation of Luther's own writings. Schumacher rightly points out that the Finnish school tends to conflate the early and late Luther, ignoring the development of Luther's thought, especially his great Reformation discovery. It is somewhat surprising that one of the most significant passages for the Finnish school comes from a Christmas sermon in 1514, when Luther hadn't yet developed his mature understanding of justification. In some of the more extreme forms of the Finnish approach (Karkkainen for example), the Reformation discovery is almost completely ignored, and one wonders why the Medieval church would even have an issue with Luther's view of justification if this interpretation were correct. Here is where I think Schumacher paints with too broad a brush. While many in this school ignore the categories of imputation, and even sola fide, Mannermaa is careful to place these categories in the context of Luther's overall thought, though I do agree that he downplays their importance. This chapter demonstrates that some of the language used by the Finnish school doesn't mean what they claim in the context of Luther's own writings. However, I remain convinced of the central thesis of Mannermaa that Luther teaches that an ontological union with Christ is the metaphysical basis for God's gracious imputation. In otherwords, Christ is truly present in faith, giving himself to the Christian as righteousness, especially through the debt paid on the cross and Christ's victory over the devil according to both natures; this does not neglect the fact that the union of God and man in the incarnation is also a necessary part of the Christian's righteousness. (Regarding the so-called "active obedience" of Christ, I don't find this theme in Luther, though I personally do affirm its validity).
One of my primary areas of interest, especially as I dealt with this topic in my book The Righteousness of One: An Evaluation of Early Patristic Soteriology in Light of the New Perspective on Paul, is in the connection between Luther's theology and that of the Church fathers. Schumacher convincingly demonstrates that the influence of the Greek fathers on Luther has been overstated by the Finnish school. Luther's primary influences, rather, were Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome, Bernard, and the German mystical tradition. He correctly points out that deification language in Luther is taken from medieval mysticism, and is thus not identical with Eastern conceptions of theosis. I would point out, however, that there are many commonalities between the mystical tradition which Luther praises and the Eastern fathers. Whether the Eastern fathers had any significant influence on Bernard, Tauler, or the Theologia Germanica remains to be demonstrated, but one cannot help seeing certain common themes. The Theologia Germanica, for example, states: “God assumed human nature or humanity. He
became humanized and man became divinized. That is the way amends were made." (The Theologia Germanica of Martin Luther, 63) It seems unthinkable to me that Luther would promote and publish the Theologia Germanica and the works of Tauler throughout his life if he didn't agree with their conviction that salvation is in some sense an ontological event.
Schumacher's book is a fascinating read, and is essential to grapple with for any interested in this issue. Schumacher points out some of the genuine flaws in Finnish Luther research, which often lets an ecumenical agenda guide research, rather than letting the evidence speak for itself. However, in doing this, Shumacher swings too far in the other direction, ignoring the ontological soteriological concepts that are prominent in such works as "On Christian Liberty", "Two Kinds of Righteousness", and the 1535 Galatians commentary. The fact that Luther could promote both Melancthon's works which deal almost exclusively in legal categories, and the Theologia Germanica which deals almost exclusively in ontological categories should show us that both sides in this debate have often set up a false dichotomy which was foreign to Luther.
Saturday, June 1, 2013
A Review of "Inhabiting the Cruciform God" by Michael J. Gorman
Michael J. Gorman's work Inhabiting the Cruciform God: Kenosis, Justification, and Theosis in Paul's Narrative Soteriology, is one in a number of works seeking to reinterpret Paul's theology. Rather than defending traditional Pauline interpretation, or getting on the New Perspective bandwagon, Gorman offers a proposal that transcends other interpretive grids.
For Gorman, the center of Pauline thought is not to be found in forensic justification (Luther), nor is it to be found in the concept of covenant community (Wright). Rather, "theosis is the center of Paul's theology." (171) Theosis, for Gorman, is a thoroughly Christological reality, and can be called "Christification." Gorman's concept of theosis shares similarities with the Eastern Orthodox approach, but is not synonymous. For Gorman, theosis is primarily cruciformity. God's nature is cruciform, and thus theosis is living the cruciform life, mirroring God's self giving love. Gorman proposes that the Carmen Christi of Philippians 2:6-11 is Paul's "master story." This text serves as a lens through which Paul's theology is to be read. Gorman argues, convincingly I think, that the phrase "although he was in the form of God" can be read "because he was in the form of God." In other words, the incarnation is not contrary to God's normal manner of acting, but is thoroughly consistent with God's character. In fact, it is the ultimate revelation of God's character. Thus, in contrast to human perceptions of divinity which are linked with political power, God's power in shown in weakness. It is of God's essence and character to be self-giving. In Gorman's words, "divinity has kenotic servanthood as its essential attribute."(31)
There is a redefinition of the term "Justification" in Gorman's writing. For Gorman, justification is not a purely forensic reality, but is thoroughly participatory. Trying to overcome the division common in Pauline studies between juridical and participationist soteriology, Gorman contends that "Paul has not two soteriological models (juridical and participationist) but one, justification by co-crucifixion, meaning restoration to right covenantal relations with God and others by participation in Christ's quintessential covenantal act of faith and love on the cross."(45) Justification is a covenantal category, and it involves participation in Christ's death and resurrection. The believer, through faith, is incorporated into Christ and is "co-crucified" with Jesus. Through this crucifixion, covenantal relations are restored. This involves both the restoration of one's relationship with God, and the restoration of the relationship one has with fellow man. Gorman discusses Galatians 2, in which Paul connects justification with participation in Christ's death. This causes Gorman to conclude that "Justification by faith, then, is a death-and-resurrection experience."(69)
The exegesis that Gorman provides is challenging, and does point to a connection between justification and the death and resurrection of the believer. However, it is not entirely convincing. Gorman contends that justification is not a judicial term, and does so through the text in Galatians 2. However, he does not spend time exegeting various texts which would seem to put this idea into doubt. For example, Romans 8:33-34 is a text that has been used since the Reformation to defend a legal reading of justification. Paul writes, "Who shall bring any charge against God's elect? It is God who justifies. Who is to condemn?" In this text, Paul contrasts justification with condemnation; the assumption is that both are legal terms that can be contrasted with one another. Because of justification, no charge can be brought against the believer. A detailed exegesis of this text would have to be done for Gorman's thesis to hold, which would demonstrate that Paul is not using legal categories here. Another text, which Gorman mentions only in passing, is Romans 4:4-5. "Now to the one who works, his wages are not counted as a gift but as his due. And to the one who does not work but believes in him who justifies the ungodly, his faith is counted as righteousness." The contrast between faith and works, as well as the language of crediting in contrast to earning, point to a thoroughly Reformational understanding of justification. This text simply doesn't fit many of the contemporary readings of Paul. It is usually passed over without a lengthy discussion.
It's my contention that Gorman is correct about a number of points in this work. First, it is part of God's nature to be self-giving. In contrast to the Reformed conviction that God's own glory is his ultimate concern, Paul would agree with Luther that salvation through self-donation is God's "proper work." Gorman has also demonstrated that there is a closer connection in Paul's theology between justification and participation in Christ, specifically in his death and resurrection, than many Pauline interpreters have been willing to allow. Justification does involve a death and resurrection as Gorman contends. However, I don't think there are grounds for simply dismissing the traditional forensic approach to justification in Paul. This is especially clear in Romans 4:4-5 and 8:33-34, but can also be demonstrated elsewhere in his epistles. I contend that justification includes legal and participationist categories. When justified, the believer is imputed righteous by the righteousness of Christ. However, in light of Paul's participationist theology, this justification also involves a death and resurrection of the sinner through mystical union with Chist's life, death, and resurrection.
Gorman's work is challenging, and is refreshing in that he avoids many of the typical false dichotomies presented in contemporary Pauline scholarship. However, like much of the New Perspective, Gorman's work ultimately privileges certain aspects of Pauline thought over others, and ultimately misses the Reformation's understanding of Paul, which I still believe (unpopular as it may be) to be exegetically warranted.
For Gorman, the center of Pauline thought is not to be found in forensic justification (Luther), nor is it to be found in the concept of covenant community (Wright). Rather, "theosis is the center of Paul's theology." (171) Theosis, for Gorman, is a thoroughly Christological reality, and can be called "Christification." Gorman's concept of theosis shares similarities with the Eastern Orthodox approach, but is not synonymous. For Gorman, theosis is primarily cruciformity. God's nature is cruciform, and thus theosis is living the cruciform life, mirroring God's self giving love. Gorman proposes that the Carmen Christi of Philippians 2:6-11 is Paul's "master story." This text serves as a lens through which Paul's theology is to be read. Gorman argues, convincingly I think, that the phrase "although he was in the form of God" can be read "because he was in the form of God." In other words, the incarnation is not contrary to God's normal manner of acting, but is thoroughly consistent with God's character. In fact, it is the ultimate revelation of God's character. Thus, in contrast to human perceptions of divinity which are linked with political power, God's power in shown in weakness. It is of God's essence and character to be self-giving. In Gorman's words, "divinity has kenotic servanthood as its essential attribute."(31)
There is a redefinition of the term "Justification" in Gorman's writing. For Gorman, justification is not a purely forensic reality, but is thoroughly participatory. Trying to overcome the division common in Pauline studies between juridical and participationist soteriology, Gorman contends that "Paul has not two soteriological models (juridical and participationist) but one, justification by co-crucifixion, meaning restoration to right covenantal relations with God and others by participation in Christ's quintessential covenantal act of faith and love on the cross."(45) Justification is a covenantal category, and it involves participation in Christ's death and resurrection. The believer, through faith, is incorporated into Christ and is "co-crucified" with Jesus. Through this crucifixion, covenantal relations are restored. This involves both the restoration of one's relationship with God, and the restoration of the relationship one has with fellow man. Gorman discusses Galatians 2, in which Paul connects justification with participation in Christ's death. This causes Gorman to conclude that "Justification by faith, then, is a death-and-resurrection experience."(69)
The exegesis that Gorman provides is challenging, and does point to a connection between justification and the death and resurrection of the believer. However, it is not entirely convincing. Gorman contends that justification is not a judicial term, and does so through the text in Galatians 2. However, he does not spend time exegeting various texts which would seem to put this idea into doubt. For example, Romans 8:33-34 is a text that has been used since the Reformation to defend a legal reading of justification. Paul writes, "Who shall bring any charge against God's elect? It is God who justifies. Who is to condemn?" In this text, Paul contrasts justification with condemnation; the assumption is that both are legal terms that can be contrasted with one another. Because of justification, no charge can be brought against the believer. A detailed exegesis of this text would have to be done for Gorman's thesis to hold, which would demonstrate that Paul is not using legal categories here. Another text, which Gorman mentions only in passing, is Romans 4:4-5. "Now to the one who works, his wages are not counted as a gift but as his due. And to the one who does not work but believes in him who justifies the ungodly, his faith is counted as righteousness." The contrast between faith and works, as well as the language of crediting in contrast to earning, point to a thoroughly Reformational understanding of justification. This text simply doesn't fit many of the contemporary readings of Paul. It is usually passed over without a lengthy discussion.
It's my contention that Gorman is correct about a number of points in this work. First, it is part of God's nature to be self-giving. In contrast to the Reformed conviction that God's own glory is his ultimate concern, Paul would agree with Luther that salvation through self-donation is God's "proper work." Gorman has also demonstrated that there is a closer connection in Paul's theology between justification and participation in Christ, specifically in his death and resurrection, than many Pauline interpreters have been willing to allow. Justification does involve a death and resurrection as Gorman contends. However, I don't think there are grounds for simply dismissing the traditional forensic approach to justification in Paul. This is especially clear in Romans 4:4-5 and 8:33-34, but can also be demonstrated elsewhere in his epistles. I contend that justification includes legal and participationist categories. When justified, the believer is imputed righteous by the righteousness of Christ. However, in light of Paul's participationist theology, this justification also involves a death and resurrection of the sinner through mystical union with Chist's life, death, and resurrection.
Gorman's work is challenging, and is refreshing in that he avoids many of the typical false dichotomies presented in contemporary Pauline scholarship. However, like much of the New Perspective, Gorman's work ultimately privileges certain aspects of Pauline thought over others, and ultimately misses the Reformation's understanding of Paul, which I still believe (unpopular as it may be) to be exegetically warranted.
Tuesday, May 28, 2013
Osiander and the Finnish Interpretation of Luther
When I published my article "A Lutheran Response to Justification: Five Views," (which can be found here) I was suspected by some of being guilty of the teaching of Osiander, which was condemned by the Formula of Concord. This is due to my adherence to certain themes of the Finnish interpretation of Luther; namely, that Luther's soteriology is participationist rather than purely juridical. I argued that justification is not a bare declaration wherein Christ's righteousness is passed to the believer in the heavenly Law-court, but it involves the reception of the person of Christ. In other words, Christ's attributes are not separated from His person. One does not receive Christ's righteousness without receiving Christ Himself.
I want to clear up some misconceptions, since my upcoming book "The Righteousness of One" is highly indebted to the Finnish school of thought. In my view, Luther teaches that Christ is present in faith. Faith receives Christ's person, and based on this mystical union, the believer is declared righteous by the righteousness of Christ. I agree with much of what Mannermaa has done in finding a doctrine of theosis in Luther, but I disagree with him on some major points. There is not an exact identification of justification/theosis in Luther's thought, but they are related concepts, and both important to his theological project.
First, let me clarify that I disagree with much of what has been done by figures other than Mannermaa in this school of thinking. Karkkainen, for example, conflates justification and theosis, so as to neglect important reformation themes, such as the imputation of Christ's righteousness which are central to Luther's thought. For Karkkainen, "Justification for Luther means primarily participation in God through the indwelling of Christ in the heart through the Spirit." (One With God, 59) I think we would do better to take Luther's own word for it when he defines justification as the fact that "through faith we receive a different, new, clean heart and that, for the sake of Christ our mediator, God will and does regard us as completely righteous and holy." (SA 12:1)For Luther, there is a real participation in God through the indwelling Christ, but this is not to be equated with justification itself.
It's argued by many in the Confessional Lutheran camp that the Finnish interpretation of Luther is essentially a modified form of Osiander's theology. It is also argued by the Finnish writers that the Lutheran Confessions depart from Luther's teaching that Christ is present in faith, placing mystical union as subsequent to justification, rather than vice versa. I don't think such a strict division exists between Luther and the Formula on this point.
The Formula does not condemn what is proposed by Mannermaa as Luther's teaching on mystical union. What is condemned is the teaching of Osiander that one is justified based on the indwelling divine nature of Christ. Contrary to this, Luther teaches that justification comes as a result of both natures of Christ, primarily through his life giving death and resurrection. The other false teaching of Osiander, as condemned by the Formula, is that believers are in any sense justified by their own works. That's why the majority of Article III argues, not against mystical union, but against the contention that justification is based on the renewal or good works of the sinner. Look, for example at III.35:
"Therefore, even if the converted and believers have the beginnings of renewal, sanctification, love, virtues, and good works, yet these cannot, should not, and must not be introduced or mixed with the article of justification before God, so that the proper honor may be accorded to our Redeemer Christ ad (because our new obedience is imperfect and impure) so that the consciences under attack may have a reliable comfort." (FC SD III.35)
The point here is that justification is not based on infused love, virtues, or good works inherent in the believer. Neither I, nor Mannermaa, have taught this. It may be argued however that mystical union is, in the Formula, always a result of justification, rather than a prior or simultaneous reality: "this indwelling is a result of the righteousness of faith which precedes it." (FC SD III.54) Note that what is rejected is the idea that this indwelling that is a result of justification. It is rejected that the Osiandrian sense of indwelling, the infusion of virtues and love, precedes faith, because this would result in a righteousness based on works. That doesn't mean that indwelling of the person of Christ in faith must be subsequent to justification. It does not deny that Christ gives his whole person to the believer in justification. In fact, the Confessions reject the notion that "not God but only the gifts of God dwell in believers." (FC SD III.65)
It is worth noting that the Article III of the Formula says, "For any further, necessary explanation of this lofty and sublime article on justification before God, upon which the salvation of our souls depends, we wish to recommend to everyone the wonderful, magnificent exposition by Dr. Luther of St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, and for the sake of brevity we refer to it at this point." (FC SD III.67) This gives the Galatians commentary a semi-Confessional status, since the Lutheran fathers agreed unanimously to point to this text as a correct exposition to justification. It is the Galatians commentary of Luther which has in fact served as the basis for the Finnish school of thought. In my own reading of Luther's Galatians commentary, it seems undeniable that Christ is present in faith, and that justification involves the receiving of Christ's person as righteousness.
I hope this helps clarify some of my positions on this issue. I affirm sola fide, the imputation of Christ's righteousness, Christ's active and passive obedience, and all the other traditional themes associated with justification in the Lutheran tradition. I am trying to clarify this, since some seem to think that my association with the Finnish school of thought has led me to an unorthodox approach to justification. If you are interested in this issue, take a look at Kurt Marquart's essay "Luther and Theosis," which agrees with my position on the issue.
I want to clear up some misconceptions, since my upcoming book "The Righteousness of One" is highly indebted to the Finnish school of thought. In my view, Luther teaches that Christ is present in faith. Faith receives Christ's person, and based on this mystical union, the believer is declared righteous by the righteousness of Christ. I agree with much of what Mannermaa has done in finding a doctrine of theosis in Luther, but I disagree with him on some major points. There is not an exact identification of justification/theosis in Luther's thought, but they are related concepts, and both important to his theological project.
First, let me clarify that I disagree with much of what has been done by figures other than Mannermaa in this school of thinking. Karkkainen, for example, conflates justification and theosis, so as to neglect important reformation themes, such as the imputation of Christ's righteousness which are central to Luther's thought. For Karkkainen, "Justification for Luther means primarily participation in God through the indwelling of Christ in the heart through the Spirit." (One With God, 59) I think we would do better to take Luther's own word for it when he defines justification as the fact that "through faith we receive a different, new, clean heart and that, for the sake of Christ our mediator, God will and does regard us as completely righteous and holy." (SA 12:1)For Luther, there is a real participation in God through the indwelling Christ, but this is not to be equated with justification itself.
It's argued by many in the Confessional Lutheran camp that the Finnish interpretation of Luther is essentially a modified form of Osiander's theology. It is also argued by the Finnish writers that the Lutheran Confessions depart from Luther's teaching that Christ is present in faith, placing mystical union as subsequent to justification, rather than vice versa. I don't think such a strict division exists between Luther and the Formula on this point.
The Formula does not condemn what is proposed by Mannermaa as Luther's teaching on mystical union. What is condemned is the teaching of Osiander that one is justified based on the indwelling divine nature of Christ. Contrary to this, Luther teaches that justification comes as a result of both natures of Christ, primarily through his life giving death and resurrection. The other false teaching of Osiander, as condemned by the Formula, is that believers are in any sense justified by their own works. That's why the majority of Article III argues, not against mystical union, but against the contention that justification is based on the renewal or good works of the sinner. Look, for example at III.35:
"Therefore, even if the converted and believers have the beginnings of renewal, sanctification, love, virtues, and good works, yet these cannot, should not, and must not be introduced or mixed with the article of justification before God, so that the proper honor may be accorded to our Redeemer Christ ad (because our new obedience is imperfect and impure) so that the consciences under attack may have a reliable comfort." (FC SD III.35)
The point here is that justification is not based on infused love, virtues, or good works inherent in the believer. Neither I, nor Mannermaa, have taught this. It may be argued however that mystical union is, in the Formula, always a result of justification, rather than a prior or simultaneous reality: "this indwelling is a result of the righteousness of faith which precedes it." (FC SD III.54) Note that what is rejected is the idea that this indwelling that is a result of justification. It is rejected that the Osiandrian sense of indwelling, the infusion of virtues and love, precedes faith, because this would result in a righteousness based on works. That doesn't mean that indwelling of the person of Christ in faith must be subsequent to justification. It does not deny that Christ gives his whole person to the believer in justification. In fact, the Confessions reject the notion that "not God but only the gifts of God dwell in believers." (FC SD III.65)
It is worth noting that the Article III of the Formula says, "For any further, necessary explanation of this lofty and sublime article on justification before God, upon which the salvation of our souls depends, we wish to recommend to everyone the wonderful, magnificent exposition by Dr. Luther of St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, and for the sake of brevity we refer to it at this point." (FC SD III.67) This gives the Galatians commentary a semi-Confessional status, since the Lutheran fathers agreed unanimously to point to this text as a correct exposition to justification. It is the Galatians commentary of Luther which has in fact served as the basis for the Finnish school of thought. In my own reading of Luther's Galatians commentary, it seems undeniable that Christ is present in faith, and that justification involves the receiving of Christ's person as righteousness.
I hope this helps clarify some of my positions on this issue. I affirm sola fide, the imputation of Christ's righteousness, Christ's active and passive obedience, and all the other traditional themes associated with justification in the Lutheran tradition. I am trying to clarify this, since some seem to think that my association with the Finnish school of thought has led me to an unorthodox approach to justification. If you are interested in this issue, take a look at Kurt Marquart's essay "Luther and Theosis," which agrees with my position on the issue.
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